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Herbert Hrachovec
Summary: Donald Davidson, in his Truth and Predica-
tion, suggests that Plato's concern with gluing together
subject and predicate in assertive sentences might be
traced back to Parmenides. Taking his lead this paper
discusses the connection, proceeding in three steps. A
short overview of the literature on Parmenides' fragment
B2 will be given and a Davidsonian move to reduce the
complexity of the hermeneutical situation will be propo-
sed. Secondly, given this reduction, a Parmenideian ta-
bleaux will be put forward and compared to our present
understanding of elementary propositional and predicate
logic. This will provide the basis for the concluding dis-
cussion of Plato's characteristic transformation of Par-
menides' dictum into the bundle of arguments that give
rise to the problem of the unity of propositions.
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, famously,
begins with the claim that the world is everything that is the
case. And it proceeds to explain that, as a consequence of this,
the world cannot be conceived as an accumulation of things, but
rather consists of facts. It has rarely been recognised that the-
se presuppositions are a perfect match to an observation Plato
puts forward in his Sophistes. Lion, stag, horse, according to
this remark, is a list of things rather than a lìgoc and can-
not express a state of aﬀairs. Verbs have to be mixed with nouns
for sentence formation (Sophistes 262c): Only if eÊdoØ (forms,
concepts) are interwoven, discourse can arise (Sophistes 259e).
Donald Davidson takes these Platonic observations as the point
of departure for his investigations into the unity of the propositi-
on. One cannot interweave list items; there has to be some glue
holding together propositions. But given the necessary diﬀerence
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between things (names) and whatever makes for their conﬁgura-
tion in states of aﬀairs (sentences), the problem of how they can
be made to ﬁt together emerges. Surely a sentence knits these
two entities together . . .  (Davidson 2005: 92).
Starting with Plato, Davidson traces the problem throughout the
history of Western philosophy. The present contribution is, howe-
ver, not concerned with the unfolding of this issue. (Cf. Hrachoves
2008) Taking up a hint of Davidson's it looks into the opposite
direction. Here is the remark:
What is of present interest is that Plato, goaded perhaps
by Parmenides, introduced the problem to Western phi-
losophy . . . (Davidson 2005: 83)
Davidson does not elaborate, but his footnote points to Plato's
discussion of the famous Parmenideian counsel to choose the path
of being rather than that of not being. The Platonic discour-
se about states of aﬀairs is the result of a critical examination
of Parmenides' considerations which, consequently, belong to the
pre-history of the problem of the unity of the proposition David-
son is concerned with.
I will proceed in three steps. A short overview of the literature
on Parmenides' fragment B2 will be given. It is impossible to
present the elaborate and controversial discussions on this topic
in detail. A Davidsonian move to reduce the complexity of the
hermeneutical situation will be proposed instead. Secondly, gi-
ven this reduction, a Parmenideian tableaux will be put forward
and compared to our present understanding of elementary pro-
positional and predicate logic. This will provide the basis for the
concluding discussion of Plato's characteristic transformation of
Parmenides' dictum into the bundle of arguments that give rise
to the problem of the unity of propositions.
Approaches to Parmenides B 2.3 and B 2.5
The most recent, comprehensive account of the scholarly discus-
sion surrounding the Parmenides fragment can be found in Maria
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Marcinkowska-Rosól's, magisterial dissertation on the Parmeni-
deian conception of noeØn (noein). Marcinkowska-Rosól (2010)
The philosopher ﬁnds himself confronted with a Goddess which
presents her with a choice between two ways to go:
1. ﬁípwc êstinﬂ and ﬁ±c oÎk êstin m eÚnaiﬂ (hopos estin, hos ouk
estin me einai)
that (?) is and that not being is not
2. ﬁ±c oÎk êstinﬂ and ﬁêsti m eÚnaiﬂ (hos ouk estin, esti me einai)
that (?) is not and not being is
Understanding these formulaic expressions has turned out to be
diﬃcult. There are (at a ﬁrst approximation) three diﬀerent kinds
of approaches that should be mentioned. Interpreters (1) are
struggling to get a grasp on the syntax and semantics of those
words. But since these turn out to be non-standard constructions
(2) they also have to cope with the characteristic peculiarities of
the formulae. The obvious syntactic irregularity in ípwc êstin
is the lack of a subject expression. That (?) is immediately rai-
ses the question of what is supposed to be (or not to be). Several
proposals have been made to supply a plausible supplement or to
avoid the problem in a diﬀerent way. (3) And there are a number
of remarkable treatments of Parmenides outside the constraints
of logical analysis, approaching Being in a more continental way
(Heinrich 1982; Austin 2007; Wilkinson 2009).
According to the conventions of standard grammar (including
hidden presuppositions) the use of êstin should be supplemented
with some subject matter. One option is to suppose that Parme-
nides talks about any object of thought, knowledge (Owen 1960;
Kahn 1986) or investigation (Barnes 1979). Another one is to
cast the net even wider and read him as refering to the whole
of reality (Verdenius 1966; Tugendhat 1992) which, eventually,
seems quite close to the traditional insertion of Being. Ordinary
language is not designed to easily deal with the semantical inde-
terminacy provoked by the syntactic ellipsis. Given a background
in symbolic logic it seems natural to regard êstin as an unsa-
turated expression and to try to deal with its indeterminacy in
contemporary ways.
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An inﬂuential approach along these lines has been pioneered by
Guido Calogero as early as 1936 (Calogero 1936, 1977). He consi-
dered the Parmenideian êstin as a kind of metalanguage variable
(cf. Mourelatos und Vlastos (2008): 51ﬀ.), indicating the predi-
cative form of sentences. Parmenides should, according to this
reading, be taken to use the expression under consideration as an
indicator of a common feature of all object-language sentences.
Is could then be rendered as  . . . is . . . , indicating possible
substitutions for arbitrary subjects und predicates. Finally, it has
been argued that philology and/or logical analysis cannot resolve
this particular puzzle, which has, therefore, to be tackled within
a more enterprising imaginative style. The interplay between im-
mediacy and distance have, among other motives, been proposed
as general philosophical concerns (Henn 2003: 119). A detailed
discussion of these issues cannot be provided here. The paper is
focussed on D. Davidson's remark linking the Platonic motive
back to Parmenides, so we have to start with Plato's basic intui-
tion that in uttering an aﬃrmative sentence one is joining nouns
and verbs (sumplèkwn t û mata toØc înmasi (Sophistes 262d).
The question is: How does Parmenides enter the picture?
Within a traditional hermeneutical approach the question
amounts to a two-folded challenge. In addition to understanding
the phrases from Parmenides' poem an understanding of Plato's
understanding of Parmenides has to be presupposed for a compa-
rison to be made. Since scholarly opinions on the fragment (and
on Plato's response) diverge to a considerable degree, this is a her-
culean task. A diﬀerent approach will be taken here. Following
the lead provided by Calogero and Mourelatos the Parmenides
formula will be regarded as an advice concerning investigative
sentences of an object language. It's peculiar character will be
highlighted by reference to the famous Quine-Davidson thought
experiment proposing a radical interpretation of a jungle langua-
ge. How would a charitable interpretation of the Parmenides quo-
te look like if we try to locate it within the framework of attempts
to understand incomprehensible utterances from scratch? What
message can be contained in these pronouncements?
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According to Plato's suggestion sentences synthesize nouns and
verbs to achieve assertive force. Relative to this standard view
Parmenides' ﬁ¹poc êstinﬂ seems  at ﬁrst sight  to provide a
structure that may be imposed upon those words rather than to
communicate some particular content. If we, tentatively, placed
the Parmenideian prompt into a jungle setting one thing is ob-
vious: It would be impossible to develop an understanding of a
foreign language starting with this particular segment. We could
not relate the sounds to any particular observable event. Since
êstin pointedly lacks any handle connected to an actual envi-
ronment, observers would necessarily be at a loss concerning its
straightaway meaning  at least as long as basic meaning is sup-
posed to arise from a person's capability to match language with
sense impressions. (An ontological point of view actually hinges
on the rejection of this presupposition.) If an explorer were to
pick out something like is from the linguistic data, trying to
ﬁnd some deﬁnite thing or action it might indicate, she would 
by design  fail. I take this as an argument supporting the rea-
ding of êstin as standing in for a logical form. If this expression
is doing some work, i.e. if it is not a superﬂuous add-on accom-
panying an utterance (like a cough), it has to function one level
up from nouns and verbs.
A further observation concerns the determination of logical forms.
If the meta-language interpretation is granted, the Parmenideian
proposition is quite unique. Whereas gavagai is by construction
open to diﬀerent parsings, êstin cannot be read as an opaque sen-
tence. It is impossible to unfold it into components that could, in
various conﬁgurations, constitute meaningful sentences. Its func-
tion is to turn certain lists into sentences: Theaitetos, sitting ⇒
Theaitetos is sitting. Lists lack assertive force and consequently
the is can be taken as indication of the assertive character of
a sentence. Gavagai, on the other hand, is to be scrutinized for
component sub-expressions uniﬁed in some particular assertion.
Two diﬀerent one-word prompts have to be distinguished. First
level utterances can, according to the premise of radical interpre-
tation, be systematically parsed into familiar constituents, if we
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are dealing with a comprehensible language at all. But there will
be no similar analysis of the second kind of utterance. Whatever
its semantic role, it cannot consist in some material contribution
to a sentence's meaning. It cannot, in an ordinary sense, interact
with its components, like (e.g.) Socrates and wisdom. Keep this
in mind for the coming discussion of how sentence unity is to be
achieved.
The parmenideian tableaux
The jungle scenario does not allow expressions of logical form as
starting points for investigations. Its purpose is precisely to show
how ontology is underdetermined by sense perception. Taken at
face value the procedure is powerless when applied to an isolated
auxiliary verb; radical translation is, after all, to be achieved in
an empirical setting. Some logical vocabulary has, however, to
be included in every radical interpretation: it would be impos-
sible to construct an appropriate pattern without e.g. a simple
set of logical connectives. But notice that the indeterminacy of
translation also holds for those expressions. There is no guaran-
tee that the supposed negation operator works as expected. If
we regard the Parmenides fragment as a strange utterance to be
made sense of, a convenient way is to take it as an ontological
pronouncement articulated in an object language. (Things can
be touched.) The task then becomes to analyze the fragment by
means of our contemporary hermeneutical equipment.
The reader is given a clearly symmetrical verbal pattern:
(1a) ípwc êstin / ±c oÎk êstin m eÚnai
(1b) that (?) is / that not being is not
(2a) ±c oÎk êstin / êsti m eÚnai
(2b) that (?) is is not / not being is
Let êstin and eÚnai be indicators of the form of predication. åpwc
and ±c designate the conjunctive that, oÎk and m are read as
negation operators. Given this linguistic frame a ﬁeld of possible
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logical constellations opens up. In contrast to common interpreta-
tional strategies we are focussing on the formal features of these
two lines taken out of their wider context. While this procedure
cannot claim to oﬀer an adequate reading of Parmenides' poem, it
is suﬃcient to highlight certain features of his thinking that drew
Plato's criticism. They will, as it turns out, be the Parmenideian
provenance of the problem of the unity of the proposition.
Maria Marcinkowska-Rosól has proposed to read êstin and oÎk
êstin as names of thoughts (cf. 2010: 53ﬀ.), and in particular
the thought of what is or what is not. This move neatly avoids
the need to worry about possible insertions into an open formula
. . . is: Since names are closed expressions there is no need for an
insertion. This solution is, however, unfeasible from the point of
view of logical analysis. Names cannot ﬁgure as that-clauses and
they cannot be denied either. That Julius Caesar is inadmissi-
ble in standard grammar. Given a contemporary understanding
of propositional clauses and negation it is more plausible to re-
gard êstin as a kind of variable, a placeholder for any predication.
In the words of Samuel Scolnicov Parmenideian being is the on-
tological correlate of the bare aﬃrmation of a content. (2003:
18)
Names cannot be aﬃrmed; some content has to be supplied to
arrive at a proposition. And this is, obviously, the crux in Par-
menides' dictum. Bare aﬃrmation is just a gesture, devoid of any
speciﬁcs. One may ask whether it is at all possible to understand
aﬃrmation quasi per se. But as we are looking at a language from
an external point of view we may at least risk an attempt. The
task is to ﬁgure out how (1) the relative clause, (2) negation and
(3) êstin combine into a plausible pronouncement. If we regard
êstin as indicative of bare aﬃrmation it seems tempting to read
(1a) ípwc êstin as that p and (2a) ±c oÎk êstin as that not
p, which would amount to stating that positive assertions are
acceptable, while their negations are excluded. Negative talk, not
to put too ﬁne a point on this, is thereby disallowed. This would,
of course, violate propositional logic which regards that not p as
true just in case that p is false. And it does not ﬁt into Parme-
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nides' pattern either, as he allows (1b), which clearly is negative
talk. This propositional reading is further undermined by the
fact that Parmenides includes what we have decided to be a ne-
gation operator within sentences, aﬃrmed or denied. The issue,
consequently, turns on the logical dependencies between aﬃrma-
tion and negation of simple, unanalyzed sentences as well as one
possible feature of their internal structure, namely the absence
or presence of a negation operator as part of the sentence con-
struction. (For an account of negation in early Greek philosophy
compare Horn (2001).)
The distinction between external and internal negation comes
readily to mind, but let us be more careful. Comparing the en-
terprise of radical interpretation of ontological jargon with its
more down to earth sibling proves useful here. Confronted with
an utterance of gavagai the jungle linguist tries to parse the
expression, based on the assumption that it is an aﬃrmation of
some content or other. The way the world is does  supposed-
ly  enter into the information conveyed by the native's phrase.
A pattern has to be tentatively supposed to determine the mea-
ning of the sentence under consideration. In other words: radical
interpretation starts with a (context-dependent) hypothesis con-
cerning presumed content. It has, in this sense, an inbuilt bias
towards positive talk. (It is a derived move to try and initiate
discourse by pointing to the lack of something.) But this is not
how ontological considerations work. The whole point of attemp-
ting to gesture towards being is that all distinctions between
ordinary content are suspended. Consequently, the following pro-
blem arises: What is negation going to be attached to? There is
no predicate expression related to distinct content, only êstin as
indication of predicative form. Yet (1b) oÎk êstin m eÚnai is a
negated sentence, the content of which contains a negation. How
should this phrase be read?
This point concerns the permissibility of transgressing the borders
of object talk. m eÚnai does not designate the lack of something
or some quality, e.g. a ball not being red. The negation particle
is, in this case, directly attached to being. All distinctions have
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been abstracted away from the content of bare assertions which
still are supposed to support possible negation. The scope of the
negation particle is the remaining meta-variable. Now, if eÒnai is
read as an elliptic expression of an object language, a characteri-
stic conundrum arises. Trying to stay on the object level one gets
not being in analogy to not red. And since there are, undoub-
tedly, things that lack red color, one is pushed to the conclusion
that there are, similarily, things that lack being. But this amounts
to claiming that there are things that are not.
Two indeterminacies make this into a confusing problem. A term
which is best considered as belonging to a meta-language is fea-
tured in an object-language sentence and the meaning of its ne-
gation is not clearly ﬁxed. One way to read m êinai is as a denial
of predicative form. (1b) would then amount to the claim that
it is legitimate to reject sentences lacking predication. This is
a meta-language approach to Parmenides' dictum. But if we ta-
ke . . . is . . .  as a shorthand for . . . is red, . . . is square etc.
we are tempted to think of m as term negation, attaching the
negation-particle to the determinate predicative component. not
being is thus perceived as indicating something not in possessi-
on of a certain quality and hence the puzzle, since the quality in
question is not being (a thing).
The following terminological stipulations might be helpful to sort
things out:
Sentences are aﬃrmed or denied, regardless of their inter-
nal structure, which may be an assignment or exclusion
of predicates or relations.
Propositional logic covers aﬃrmation and denial. In a two-valued
system one or the other is true (and false respectively). When it
comes to internal structure two meanings of assignment can be
distinguished. (1) a simple predicative move, i.e. the bare positing
of any content (assignment1) and (2) assignment of a predicate
(assignment2). A corresponding distinction holds for exclusion,
which can be thought of as (1) the denial of the simple predicative
move (exclusion1) and (2) as an exclusion based on a determinate
predicate (exclusion2).
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Given this terminology the Parmenideian tableaux can roughly
be translated like this:
1. It is permissible to aﬃrm an assignment of something to so-
mething, as well as to deny exclusion.
2. It is, on the other hand, forbidden to aﬃrm exclusion or to
deny assignment.
assignment and exclusion have been left unspeciﬁed here.
They are meant to play a role similar to eÚnai and m eÚnai in
(1b) and (2b). The crucial issue, obviously, is how these expres-
sions should be speciﬁed, given the distinctions outlined above.
Here is one proposal:
1. It is permissible to aﬃrm assignation1 as well as to deny
exclusion1.
2. It is, on the other hand, forbidden to aﬃrm exclusion1 or to
deny assignment1
According to this metalanguage, reading Parmenides urges us
to accept sentences built on the basis of simple predication and
regards intra-sentence negation as a dissolution of the very sen-
tence it is part of. A sentence's components have to be glued to-
gether, they fall apart otherwise. And what about assignment2
and exclusion2, i.e. a reading that is not restricted to a bare
êinai-based ontology? Turning to Plato's criticism of Parmenides
provides a good starting point to discuss this issue.
Plato on Parmenides, Davidson on Plato
One way to advance a charitable interpretation of the Parmenides
dictum is the following one: the philosopher is simply stating the
principle of tÀn eÊdwn sumplok (the interweaving of forms) spel-
led out in Plato's Sophistes. Sentences have to assign something
to something. Their predicative form is the necessary condition
for any assertion to suceed. Any abolition of this form will lead
to disintegration. It will not, in Platonic terms, result in a logoc.
112 Herbert Hrachovec
But predication of what? This question touches upon the ob-
ject language insertion for the implicit variable we have treated
eÒnai as. Such insertions have to designate determinate content:
things, properties and relations. They cannot themselves be sha-
peless placeholders. Negation acquires an additional twist here.
The dismissal of the predicative form has to be distinguished from
negation employed in predicate use. Yet, the lack of any indica-
tor of determinate content in Parmenides' formula does not allow
him to discuss negation applied to ordinary predicates like red
or square. All he oﬀers is the auxiliary verb featured as stand-in
for object-language predicate constructions.
Parmenides' formula does not provide a hook for negation applied
to real life predicate expressions. Its only application is to eÚnai
which may be read as a kind of substitute predicate, rather than
an indication of the predicative form. Negating this expression
(not being) is then conceived as predicating the property of not
being to something (which has to be in order to qualify for having
properties). The obvious way to escape from the ensuing paradox
is to disentangle the use of the auxiliary being. The point of in-
troducing assignments2 and exclusions2 in the previous section
was precisely to be able to handle negation of terms signifying
determinate concepts even though they are absent in Parmeni-
des' elliptical formula, which lacks the expressive capabilities to
deal with the semantic diﬀerences commonly associated with the
use of predicates. Parmenides' peculiar ontological stance derives
from the fact that his point of reference is the general formati-
on of sentences. If one considers sentences containing discursive
claims, two levels of abstraction have to be attended to. Some
synthesis (often indicated by eÚnai) has to be presupposed. De-
nying eÚnai amounts to a breakdown of sentence communication.
And one has to account for (the logic of) deﬁnite discourse i.e.
aﬃrmation and denial of the possession of qualities to things.
In his Sophistes Plato discusses, among other things, appearan-
ces, pictures, made-up stories and movement. All those pheno-
mena can only be understood if a delicate arrangement between
truth claims and negation is achieved. A moving object does not
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stay at one particular location, it is not yet here and not there
anymore (Sophistes 256a-d). Plato is approaching the issues via
forms (eÊdoi), that combine to make a sentence (Sophistes 259e).
We cannot go into the details of his treatment, but the crucial
point is that his understanding of being and negation is richer
than that of his predecessor. (For extensive discussions about
the semantics of negation in Plato's dialogue see Pelletier (1990),
Pelletier (1983).) Parmenides' m ïn, in Plato's view, referred to
the opposite (ânantÐon) of being (Sophistes 257b), forcing upon
us the stark contrast between assertible truth and the forbidden
realm of not being. But if one takes into account term negation
a wider perspective opens up. Negation does not just operate on
opposites, but also serves as a marker of distinctions in a cogniti-
ve and/or ontological matrix. Something is red, not red, or green,
which is another color (éteron). Diﬀerences are introduced by
Plato to refute the great Parmenides (Sophistes 237a). In calling
something m ïn we are really considering it within a diﬀerential
system. Plato spells this out quite clearly as a semantic maxim
of his ontology:
åpìtan tä m ïn lègwmen, ±c êoiken, oÎk ânantÐon ti
lègomen toÜ întoc ll> éteron mìnon.
When we say not-being, we speak, think, not of some-
thing that is the opposite of being, but only of something
diﬀerent. (Sophistes 257b)
Parmenides put forward a framework shaped by two-valued logic,
which he then supplemented with conclusions drawn from expres-
sions oscillating between object- and metalanguage. In Plato we
ﬁnd a more congenial attempt at predicative analysis. It is pre-
cisely Plato's rejection of Parmenides' dualism that allows him
to make sentences refer to diﬀerent forms and to represent their
interweaving. And this achievement is based upon the recognition
that internal negation applies to real life predicates rather than
to an expression representing any predicate at all.
We have worked our way from the Parmenideian pronouncement
to Platon's criticism. Donald Davidson refers to exactly these
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considerations when talking about Platon having been possibly
been goaded by Parmenides (2005: 80). In the light of the pre-
ceding discussion we can now put the problem of the unity of the
proposition into a larger framework.
The decisive distinction between Parmenides' and Plato's ac-
counts is the latter's provision of actually distinct components to
make a sentence. While Parmenides on his part employs sentence-
like expressions, those constructions concern the form of sen-
tences  albeit in the guise of an ordinary sentence. Against
this Plato was faced with the question of how actually distinct
sentence-components could hold together, while Parmenides, ac-
cording to the present interpretation, was focussed on a sentence's
overall cohesive power. With an eye on the scenario of radical in-
terpretation the diﬀerence in view can be put succinctly: There
is no problem of the unity of a proposition if gavagai is taken
as a whole. The underlying sounds, taken as assertion, do not
by themselves force anyone to try an analysis by means of stan-
dard Indo-German grammar. The puzzle about the interweaving
of forms arises from within a certain hermeneutical stance. A
person observing a car crash might utter the word awful  no
problematic unity is at stake in such cases. The problem arises
if we turn to a more explicit reading of this exclamation, e.g.
This is awful! Parmenides' sentence, it is true, do not belong to
such a naturalistic environment. It can, however, be regarded as
a kind of meta-language equivalent of one-word sentences indi-
cating that something is, rather than what is, to quote a famous
Wittgenstein adage (2001, 5.552). For another interesting parallel
between Parmenides and Wittgenstein, see Livingston (2011).
If this line of argument is granted as a possible account of the
relationship between Parmenides' puzzle and Plato's considera-
tions about sentence construction, some doubts concerning the
Davidsonian enterprise to solve the problem of unity emerge.
Davidson has vividly recalled the diﬃculty of accounting for the
role of predication once this role is frozen into a symbol inten-
ded to designate this role. He is quite right in pointing out that
this constellation has troubled philosophers up to Frege, Russell
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and the early Wittgenstein. But one wonders whether his techni-
cal Tarskian procedure to deﬂect the challenge is the appropriate
reaction to this conundrum. Think of a recipy: it consists of a
list of ingredients and a number of instructions. Imagine someo-
ne coming up with the following complaint in trying to prepa-
re a meal: I have assembled all the necessary stuﬀ  now, how
do I add heat and time of cooking? It would be a misdirected
question. Heat and time cannot be added to the mix like salt
and pepper. Knowing how to cook implies knowing what to do
with given raw materials. This is, incidently, precisely the soluti-
on Wittgenstein proposed for his erstwhile problem. He begins his
Philosophical Investigation by presenting one-word sentences of
the builder (block, pillar, slab, . . . ), immediately followed by
the shopping order Go, fetch me three red apples. How does the
addressee know how the components of this sentence ﬁt together?
 Well, this is how he has learned to proceed.
Wittgenstein's prominent switch from one-word sentences to mo-
re complicated verbal utterances deﬂates the problem of language
and ontology by a pragmatic move. His advice is blunt: Questions
come to an end. Some intermediary considerations can certainly
be inserted between Plato's problem and its summary dismissal.
A meal has been prepared and a prospective cook asks herself:
How was this done?. The explanation might contain a phrase
like add salt and stir. Or, to put it in more conventional phi-
losophical terms: gavagai is uttered and a linguist asks herself:
What does this mean?. The composition of the sentence (or the
meal) is something to be hypothetically worked out on part of the
observer. This is the operative idea behind the theoretical device
of radical interpretation. But if it is from the outside that a gram-
mar is imposed upon linguistic phenomena the question of how
the explanation works has to be distinguished from an account of
the speakers' competence. The question turns on the attempts to
understand their utterances and hence on the instruments of the
interpretative language. How do we know about the unity of the
sentences that we propose in order to translate a foreign idiom?
The answer is that we have learned to deal with an ensemble of
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linguistic givens in a certain way. How can 2 and 2 combine to
give 4?  It is a way of talking that we ﬁnd helpful in dealing
with aggregates.
A Wittgensteinian resolution of the Platonic problem along tho-
se lines has convincingly been spelled out by Ernst Tugenhat
(Tugendhat 1976: 181ﬀ.). It seems to preclude the need to inves-
tigate the pre-history of this particular philosophical evergreen.
The Parmenides-Plato dispute we were discussing can neverthe-
less contribute to an understanding of presupposition implicit in
ordinary discourse. We do not just address each other with asser-
tive claims; we allow these claims to be disputed within a network
of diﬀerences which is built starting from negation operative bet-
ween predicates. The logical depth grammar of feasible predicates
contains a hidden negation, distinguishing them from alternati-
ves. This is Plato's advance on Parmenides, which triggers the
problem of the unity of the proposition, which held so many phi-
losophers in its grip. We may not be caught by its spell any more.
But it is only fair to regard it as a historic advance in accounting
for human communication.
References
Austin, S.: Parmenides and the History of Dialectic: Three
Essays. Las Vegas, Nev: Parmenides Pub, 2007.
Barnes, J.: Parmenides and the Eleatic One. In: Archiv für Ge-
schichte der Philosophie, 61 1, 1979.
Calogero, G.: Parmenides e la genesi della logica classica. In: An-
nali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, p. 143185, 1936.
 Studi sull'eleatismo. Firenze: La nuova Italia, 1977.
Davidson, D.: Truth and Predication. Harvard University Press,
2005.
Preliminaries to a Platonic Problem 117
Heinrich, K.: Parmenides und Jona. Vier Studien über das Ver-
hältnis von Philosophie und Mythologie. Basel/Frankfurt: Stro-
emfeld, 1982.
Henn, M. J.: Parmenides of Elea: a verse translation with in-
terpretative essays and commentary to the text . Greenwood
Publishing Group, 2003.
Horn, L. R.: A natural history of negation. Stanford: CSLI Pu-
blications, 2001.
Hrachovec, H.: Ganze Sätze. Davidson über Prädikation. In: Con-
ceptus. Zeitschrift für Philosophie, 91, p. 1131, 2008.
Kahn, C.: Retrospect on the Verb "to Beänd the Concept of
Being. In: Hintikka, S. K. . J. (Ed.), The Logic of Being , p.
128, Dordrecht, 1986.
Livingston, P. M.: The Politics of Logic Badiou, Wittgen-
stein, and the Consequences of Formalism. Oxford: Routled-
ge, 2011, URL http://www.unm.edu/ pmliving/Livingston-
Wittgenstein and Parmenides.doc.
Marcinkowska-Rosól, M.: Die Konzeption des "noein"bei Parme-
nides von Elea. Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2010.
Mourelatos, A. P. D./ Vlastos, G.: The Route of Parmenides. Las
Vegas: Parmenides Pub, rev. and expanded ed edition, 2008.
Owen, G. E. L.: Eleatic Questions. In: The Classical Quarterly
(New Series), 10, p. 84102, 1960.
Pelletier, F. J.: Plato on not-being: some interpretations of the
symploke eidon (259e) and their relation to parmenides' pro-
blem. In: Midwest StudieMidwest Studies in Philosophy , 8 1,
p. 3566, 1983.
 Parmenides, Plato, and the Semantics of Not-Being . Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1990.
Scolnicov, S.: Plato's Parmenides. Translated with introduction
an commentary . Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of Ca-
lifornia Press, 2003.
Tugendhat, E.: Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die sprachanaly-
tische Philosophie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976.
 Das Sein und das Nichts. In: Philosophische Aufsätze, Suhr-
kamp, 1992.
118 Herbert Hrachovec
Verdenius, W. J.: Der Logosbegriﬀ bei Heraklit und Parmenides.
In: Phronesis, 11, 1966.
Wilkinson, L. A.: Parmenides and To Eon: Reconsidering Mut-
hos and Logos (Continuum Studies In Ancient Philosophy).
Continuum, 2009.
Wittgenstein, L.: Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung. Tractatus
logico-philosophicus. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2001.
Institut für Philosophie
Universität Wien
Dr.-Karl-Lueger-Ring 1
1010 Wien
Austria
herbert.hrachovec@wu.ac.at

